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LIBERALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 
 
ABSTRACT  
In  the closing decades of the twentieth century there has been an almost complete 
intellectual  triumph of the twin principles of marketization (understood here as referring 
to the liberalization of domestic markets and freer international mobility of goods, 
services, financial capital and perhaps, more arguably, labour) and democratization . A 
paradigm shift of this extent and magnitude would not have occurred in the absence of 
some broad consensus among policymakers and  (sections of) intellectuals around the 
globe  on the desirability of such a change. There seems to be  a two-fold causal nexus 
between marketization and democracy. The first is more direct, stemming from the fact 
of both systems sharing certain values and attitudes in common.  But there is also a 
second  more indirect chain from marketization to democracy, which is  predicated via 
three  sub-chains (i)  from marketization to growth, (ii) from growth to overall material 
development  welfare and (iii) from material development to social welfare and 
democracy. We examine each of these sub-links in  detail with a view to obtaining a 
greater understanding of the hypothesized role of free markets in promoting democracies.  
In the later part of the paper we examine the socio-economic outcomes governing the 
quality of democracy in a specifically Indian context.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A future historian writing of our times, would most likely describe the closing decades of 
the twentieth century as marking the complete intellectual triumph of the three principles 
of : 
(i) Marketization : This term usually refers to the liberalization of domestic markets from 
the extensive government controls, which prevailed in many LDCs and EMEs (and even 
some advanced economies) in the decades prior to the 1980s. 
(ii) Globalization :  This implies  freer international mobility of goods, services, financial 
capital and perhaps, more arguably, labour by the dismantling of the regime of extensive 
and high tariffs, quotas, current and capital account restrictions which had been in place 
since the end of World War II. 
 (iii) Democratization : This term is  used to characterize the process by which from the 
mid-1980s, several autocratic regimes were replaced (either precipitously as in the case 
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of the former Soviet Bloc or more gradually as in the case of several Asian economies) 
by regimes granting greater political liberty to its citizens. 
 
While even a summary description of the diverse  controversies underpinning this change 
of outlook in favour of free and open markets, could fill several volumes, one fact clearly 
stands out viz.  That  a paradigm shift of this extent and magnitude would not have 
occurred in the absence of some broad consensus1 among policymakers and  (sections of) 
intellectuals around the globe  on the desirability of such a change. Such a consensus 
essentially revolved around six key principles: 
 
(i) Democracy is an “absolute good” i.e. desirable for its own sake and an 
important component of individual and social welfare ( Sen (2007)). 
(ii) Higher levels of economic development are usually associated with increased 
democratization 
(iii) Free markets are a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for  economic growth 
(and development) in LDCs. 
(iv) Economic growth  enhances social welfare, so that there is a positive feedback 
from free markets to democracy, via the growth and welfare enhancing effects 
of free markets.  
(v) Democracy is also growth enhancing, so that in a sense, democracy may be 
regarded as self-sustaining 
(vi) Democracy is an important impetus for marketization, so that democracy, 
growth  and free markets may be regarded as constituting a “virtuous cycle” 
each lending strength to the other. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
Of these, the first principle (that democracy is a desirable public good) is now almost 
universally  accepted without qualification, though there are often disagreements about 
the precise form of democracy that is appropriate for a country2.   
 
Over the other five tenets, however, there is considerable room for controversy and we 
propose here to critically appraise the analytical basis of each of these, using the Indian 
liberalization experience as a point of reference.3  
 
The plan of our paper is as follows. The next two sections discuss some of the basic 
features of democracy and capitalism. As Figure 1 indicates, there is a two-fold causal 
nexus between marketization and democracy. The first is more direct, stemming from the 
fact of both systems sharing certain values and attitudes in common.  This constitutes the 
subject matter of  Section IV. But there is also a second  more indirect chain from 
marketization to democracy, which is  predicated via two  sub-chains (i)  from 
marketization to growth (and presumably to overall material development4) and  (ii) from 
material development to social welfare and democracy. We examine each of these sub-
links in some detail (Sections V and  VI ), with a view to obtaining a greater 
understanding of the hypothesized role of free markets in promoting democracies.  
Section VII delineates certain general features of Indian democracy and outlines the 
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rationale for focusing on outcomes in adjudging its quality. Section VIII discuss the three 
important outcomes (viz. the triad of growth, poverty and inequality, environment and 
natural resources, and corruption). The procedural conditions for democracy are 
examined in the Indian context in Section IX.  Finally an attempt is made to gather our 
main conclusions and indicate potential directions of future work in Section X.  
 
II DEMOCRACY : CHARACTERISTICS & SOCIETAL PRERQUISITES 
 
II.1 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The lack of agreement on a suitable definition of democracy, stands in stark contrast to 
the almost universal belief  in its desirability.  Realizing the futility of searching for a 
generally acceptable definition of democracy, political thinkers have instead  focused on 
the description of (what they view as ) the essential features of a democratic system, and 
the institutions and processes underpinning such systems (Bollen (1990), Cammack 
(1997) etc.). 
 
The three basic requirements of a democracy are usually identified as (i) participation (ii) 
political competition and (iii) the existence of a constitutional mechanism  providing for 
periodic changes of government. 
 
Participation implies that individual political preferences matter for government 
decisions.5 Another vital dimension of democracy is political competition, which 
institutionalizes mechanisms for reaching political decisions (usually via a  majority rule 
or occasionally some other consensual principle), in a manner which minimizes the 
potential for concentration of political power in the hands of any specific group (e.g. a 
military or ethnic faction, a business class, or a religious sect)6. The third essential 
component  of a representative democracy rests  on   a constitutional mechanism  for 
periodic change of government. This ability to choose among alternate contenders for 
political office is supposed to result in an optimal arrangement for societal decision-
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making, in which majority rule becomes the abiding principle by which conflicting 
interests are resolved (Weber (1946) and Schumpeter (1943,  [1987 ed.]) 
 
II. 2 SOCIAL PREREQUISITES 
 
The modern  literature on the societal prerequisites of democracy often takes as its 
starting point the, by now, classic article of Lipset (1959). His major conclusions (backed 
with some empirical justification) may be summarized in the following table (adapted 
with some modifications from Lipset (1959) p. 105), where the requisites for democracy 
are shown in the left-hand column, whereas the consequences of democracy are shown in 
the right-hand column. Most of the consequences also appear in the requisites column, 
indicating a positive feedback relationship. However some of the consequences, have the 
potential to undermine democracy in the long run (and these have been indicated with an 
asterix (*)) 
 
TABLE 
 
Requisites For Democracy Consequences of Democracy 
(i) Industrialization 
(ii) Urbanization  
(iii) Education 
(iv) Literacy 
(v) Capitalist Mode Of Production 
(vi) Egalitarian Value System 
(vii) Open Class System (i.e. Inter 
Class Mobility) 
(viii) High Participation in Voluntary 
Organizations 
(i) Mass society (*) 
(ii)  Bureaucracy (*) 
(iii) Education 
(iv) Literacy 
(v) Political Apathy (*) 
(vi) Egalitarian Value System 
(vii) Open Class system 
 
In  recent years, political thinkers have elaborated considerably  on the basic Lipset 
scheme, primarily by focusing on  democratic  rights such as freedom of speech, travel 
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and emigration, right to property, the special rights of religious and other minorities etc.( 
Diamond & Plattner (1993), Neher & Marlay (1995), etc.). There has, by now,  emerged 
a burgeoning literature on the empirical correlates of democracy, designed to examine the 
relative importance of economic vis-à-vis social, cultural, religious, ethnic and other 
determinants of democracy (e.g. Rueschemeyer (1991), Roemer (1995), Przeworski & 
Limongi (1993), Ravich (2000) etc.). 
 
III. CAPITALISM : ALTERNATIVE TAXONOMIES 
 
One of the remarkable features of the entire debate surrounding the issue of reforms in 
LDCs and EMEs is a complete lack of attention to the kind of capitalist system that was 
being projected to replace the older system of heavily state-regulated markets. The 
importance of the issue derives from the fact that the role of markets (and hence the 
socio-economic  effects of the transformation)  would crucially depend on the type of  
capitalist system that emerged as an outcome of the reforms process.  At least three 
taxonomies of capitalism have been suggested in the recent literature. 
 
1. Hall & Soskice (2001) differentiate between liberal market economies 
(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) with the U.S. serving 
as the paradigmatic illustration of the former and Germany and Japan of 
the latter.  
2. Amable (2003) has a five-fold taxonomy – market-based capitalism (U.S., 
U.K., Australia, Canada), Continental European/Rhinish model (Germany, 
France, Belgium, Austria), Mediterranean(Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), 
Welfare-statist (Scandinavian countries) and Meso-Corporatist (Asia). 
3. Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2007) adopt a more standard taxonomy 
distinguishing between oligarchic, state-guided, managerial  and 
entrepreneurial varieties of capitalism.  
 
A fact universally recognized but universally overlooked,  is  that almost all the virtues 
attributed to the role of markets by neo-classical economic analysis apply only to an ideal 
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form of capitalism characterized by perfect  market competition, free flow of information, 
absence of monopoly power and a minimalist state. Thus in the above three  taxonomies 
the varieties of capitalism which have a modicum of resemblance to this ideal are the 
LME (Hall & Soskice), the market-based model (Amable) and the entrepreneurial model 
(Baumol et al).  Our  use of the term capitalism in this paper will thus usually connote a 
system whose features closely approximate those of one of these systems.    
 
IV. DEMOCRACY & CAPITALISM : A COMMON SYSTEM OF VALUES ? 
 
There is a strong undercurrent in Western liberal philosophy, which views capitalism7 
and democracy as braided in an irrevocable historical nexus. This position finds its 
clearest and strongest expression in the writings of three influential economists viz. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1987 ed.), F. Hayek (1944, 1960) and Milton Friedman (1963). 
Differences of detail and methodological controversies apart, all three writers are 
unanimous in their assertion that capitalism and democracy are inseparable and mutually 
causal, through a common system of values characterizing economic and political 
freedom.8 The fundamental core of beliefs revolves around the enshrinement of three key 
elements – private property, market competition and Adam Smith’s invisible hand. Both 
share the common philosophy of  “free will of the individual, imperfectability of human 
beings , primacy of private values and property …. the suspicion of government  or any 
other agglomeration of power ” (Weitzman (1993), p.314). From this, the conclusion 
seems inevitable that there is a natural isomorphism between the philosophies of 
democracy and capitalism9, and neither can flourish in the absence of the other.  
 
In recent years, however, researchers have approached the issues with a more  open mind, 
which assumes additional significance in the wake of  the cataclysmic events culminating 
in the fall of Soviet communism. Their major premise is that the attitudes supporting 
democracy  are conceptually  distinct from those favouring markets. Dahl (1989), for 
example, has identified a list of social values as being conducive to democratic 
development: 
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(i) belief in the legitimacy of democratic institutions such as public contestation 
and electoral participation 
(ii) beliefs about authority relationships between government organizations and 
citizens 
(iii) confidence in the capacity of the government to deal effectively with national 
problems 
(iv) political and interpersonal trust 
(v) belief in the possibility and desirability of political cooperation and 
(vi) belief in conflict resolution among contending social groups through 
democratic mechanisms 
 
Similarly Shiller et al (1991) have attempted to assess social attitudes that foster market 
behaviour, and prominent among these are : 
 
(i) the fairness of price changes, and in particular whether it is perceived as 
legitimate for sellers to raise prices in response to demand 
(ii) attitudes towards income inequality 
(iii) attitudes towards incentive schemes for workers 
(iv) resistance to the charging of interest on loans 
(v) attitudes towards entrepreneurship 
(vi) attitudes towards speculators and  
(vii) an understanding of the rationale of compensated price changes 
 
Once it is recognized that the values at the basis of democracy and markets are distinct, 
then the irrevocable causal connection between the two, that is central to Schumpeter, 
Hayek and Friedman is no more automatic, unless it can be shown that the two sets of 
values are mutually reinforcing, or stem from a deeper set of common values. Since at the 
purely theoretical level, a resolution of this question may be problematic, researchers 
have turned their attention to empirical approaches based on surveys. The issue has 
obtained a fresh lease of life with the emergence of various republics of the former 
USSR. The  new “transformation economies” have provided a fertile ground for testing 
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several key economic and political hypotheses, bearing on people’s attitudes to 
democracy and markets. Researchers, basing their theories on attitudinal surveys such as 
those conducted by Finifter & Mickiewicz (1992), Duch (1993), Reisinger et al (1994) 
etc., have come up with several interesting perceptions. Particularly interesting is the 
conclusion that seems to be emerging fairly robustly across the surveys that commitment 
to democratic values ( in the European part of the former USSR) was often weaker than 
the desire for a change in the economic system.  Democracy was seen as of value only to 
the extent that the political change seemed to be necessary for initiating economic reform.  
 
Thus, it is somewhat questionable whether a  direct link between democracy and 
capitalism can be ascribed as confidently and as forcefully as postulated in much of the 
standard literature. We now turn to an examination of the indirect link between 
capitalism and democracy  via growth and social welfare (see Section I).  
 
V. CAPITALISM & GROWTH 
The first issue that needs to be explored is the relationship between capitalism and 
growth. It is reasonably clear that in much of neo-liberal writings, capitalism is being 
perceived as supportive of growth rather than a precondition of growth,10 and therefore 
we focus only on the unidirectional causal link from capitalism to growth.  
 The perception of a benevolent link between capitalism, economic growth, civil society 
and social welfare in general is attributable to the intellectual ascendancy of neo-classical 
economics as the mainstream view in recent years (post-1970).  It was perhaps inevitable 
that in the light of this intellectual triumph,  neo-classical economics should  spill over its 
academic boundaries and enter the arena of economic policy. The neo-liberal ideology, 
which underpinned the liberalization wave of the 1980s in LDCs and EMEs and has 
underlain many of the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank on structural 
adjustments (the so-called Washington consensus), is essentially a bastardized version of 
neo-classical economics (in a sense to be made precise below).  
 
 12 
The major theoretical conclusions of neo-classical economics are encapsulated in two 
classic  theorems. The first of these is the basic result that complete perfectly competitive 
markets lead to Pareto efficient outcomes, while the second is a partial converse to the 
first asserting that any Pareto efficient outcome (including those which are distributively 
just) can be achieved through a system of complete perfectly competitive markets. By 
themselves, these results have very limited implications for policy -- firstly because they 
apply to an unattainable ideal capitalist system and secondly even within this restricted 
context they are subject to a number of important caveats of which the DSM (Debreu, 
Sonnenschein & Mantel) theorem is probably the most important.11  
 
Neo-liberal ideology therefore seeks its intellectual basis in the third welfare theorem 
which seems to be a recent addition (see Hammond (1993)) to neo-classical welfare 
economics. This theorem, unlike its predecessors, is not confined to the ideal capitalist 
system (of complete and perfectly competitive markets),  but could apply to virtually any 
variety of capitalism. The theorem itself asserts that it is possible to reform the original 
economic system by moving in the direction of complete and perfect markets and in the 
process generate an equilibrium allocation that is Pareto superior to the original 
allocation.  
 
The crucial caveats to this theorem are four-fold : 
 
(i) Such Pareto improvements cannot be guaranteed unless those directly harmed by 
liberalization are suitably compensated by a lump sum redistributive system  
(ii) The reforms are to be in the nature of taking the existing system in the direction 
of the ideal capitalist system.  
(iii) The results have pure static validity and their dynamic justification is far from 
clear 
(iv) Natural /environmental resource constraints are completely side-stepped in this 
model.  
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The neo-classical  emphasis on free markets ignores one crucial dimension of modern 
capitalism viz. the emergence of multi-nationals, mega corporations and financial 
conglomerates. The invisible hand was intended to explain the working of competitive 
forces in an economy where market power was evenly, if not equally distributed. This 
basic premise is seriously jeopardized by the overwhelming countervailing power 
enjoyed by such mega-corporations in modern market economies. Indeed,  as Lindblom 
(1977) has observed “ It is possible that the rise of the corporation has offset or more 
than offset the decline of class as an instrument of indoctrination….That it creates a new 
core of wealth and power for a newly constructed upper class .. is also reasonably clear. 
The executive of the large corporation is, on many counts, the contemporary counterpart 
to the landed gentry of an earlier era, his voice amplified by the technology of modern 
communication… The major institutional barrier to fuller democracy may therefore be 
the autonomy of the private corporation.”  Once the reality  of mega-corporations is 
incorporated into theoretical models of laissez faire or democracy , then some of the neat 
conclusions deriving from these models are no longer sustainable.  
 
The neo-liberal ideology has cavalierly ignored these caveats and correspondingly, none 
of the reforming governments in  the Third World have paid serious attention to the 
policy  implications of these caveats in actual reform strategies. Talks about level playing 
fields and social safety nets have remained purely at the rhetorical plane and the capitalist 
systems which have resulted from reforms have been less oriented towards the 
establishment of competitive markets than towards the domination of markets by 
corporate oligarchies and financial agglomerates. In fact in several cases all that reforms 
have achieved is the replacement of public sector monopolies by private sector 
monopolies  and oligarchies (usually involving TNCs) (see Rodrik & Subramanian 
(2004) and Kohli (2006)) 
 
Our discussion should make it quite clear that the presumed theoretical case for market-
oriented internal and external economic reforms is extremely weak and whether moves in 
the direction of  some form of capitalist system  will promote economic growth (and 
social welfare in general ) or otherwise, becomes essentially an empirical issue.  
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VI. MATERIAL PROSPERITY, SOCIAL WELFARE & DEMOCRACY 
 
In examining the indirect link between capitalism and democracy, the second important 
causal chain is from material development to democracy.  
The issue of whether increased material prosperity (and general economic development) 
strengthens the democratic attitudes of the populace may seem to have a straightforward 
affirmative answer. Indeed Aristotle (1962, [330 B.C.]) had argued that only a wealthy 
society provided the opportunity for intelligent participation in public affairs, to a 
majority of its citizens.  It is difficult to disagree with Lipset’s (1959) observation that “  
A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favoured elite would 
result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny 
(popularly based dictatorship)”  
 
But while a minimal level of development might be necessary for the existence of 
democracy, the question of whether material development beyond the sustenance level 
sets in motion forces favouring democracy is a far more complex question. In an 
important recent book, Benjamin Friedman (2005) has adduced historical evidence to the 
effect that improved living standards  bring about positive changes in social values and 
raise the standard of political institutions. He also makes the fine distinction that it is  the 
growth,  rather than levels, of living standards that are critical for democratic aspirations, 
cautioning that even wealthy societies, faced with long economic stagnation   episodes, 
could potentially engender values inimical to democratic norms.  
 
Similar views have been advanced by Przeworski & Limongi (1995), Rueschemeyer et al 
(1992) and Lipset (1994). In general , these explanations predicate that economic growth 
brings in its wake greater equality of distribution, better communication, literacy and 
education. In Lipset’s words  “ … the rise of capitalism, a large middle class, an 
organized working class, increased wealth and education are associated with secularism 
and the institutions of civil society, … which facilitate other preconditions for 
democracy” (Lipset, 1994, p.7) 
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 Friedman’s position is close in spirit to the views of classical thinkers such as Condorcet, 
Montesquieu and Adam Smith , who stressed “the civilizing effects of commerce” 
(Hirschman (1986)).  Several political theorists, spanning a spectrum of ideologies from 
Marx to John Stuart Mill, have viewed capitalist development as leading to  crass 
materialism, corrosion of morality and an undermining of individual liberty. As is well 
known, Marx (1932, original publication 1872) saw  economic development and 
industrialization as culminating in a “dictatorship of the proletariat” whereas Weber 
(1922 tr. by Henderson & Parsons 1947) viewed it as likely to lead to a “dictatorship of a 
bureaucracy”.  Mill (1963, originally published 1848) warned against the excesses of the 
market, and while not completely discarding the capitalist order, vehemently argued for 
important reforms in the system, such as limitations on inheritance, the provision of 
higher quality education for all, and several other features of a welfare state socialism.  
 
Coming to modern theorists, in  his celebrated work,  Moore (1966) argued that  
successful modernization and transformation of agriculture via capitalist modes of 
production was associated with the emergence of democracies in Britain, France and the 
United States in the nineteenth century (see also Stephen (1994))12.  
 
An important group of analysts  has tried to explore whether the relationship between 
development and democracy depends on the stage, timing or path of development. 
Hirschman (1986) for example, seems to suggest that  the early stages of development 
seem to be supportive of democratic values, whereas the connection could become less 
pronounced or even perverse in the later stages of development (see also Almond 
(1991)).  
 
The issue of whether the  timing of development is an important determinant of political 
democracy has also attracted a great deal of attention. Two contending hypotheses  have 
been advanced. Firstly, there is the hypothesis due to de Schweinitz (1964) and Moore 
(1966) that the social, economic and political conditions that existed for the early 
developers were far more conducive to democracy than those confronting the late  
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developers, so that the earlier a country embarks  on a development path, the higher its 
level of political democracy. As the direct antithesis of this hypothesis, Bendix (1976), 
Collier (1975) etc. argue that late developers face stronger pressures towards adopting 
democratic ideals, because of  cultural transmission of democratic ideas from the already 
developed democracies through the medium of books, TV, education etc.  Bollen (1979) 
tried to examine  both the hypotheses  empirically from a cross country panel study, but 
found little empirical support for either. This, however, is an issue on which further 
empirical work is certainly called for. 
 
The strategy of development and the implied growth path could also be  important 
considerations in the political outcome. Roemer (1995) develops a formal  model, in 
which the crucial impetus for political transformation comes from important changes in 
citizen preferences, especially as regards civil liberties. His general conclusion is that 
political outcomes (or more specifically the emergence of democratic attitudes) is path 
dependent. Some paths (such as increasing capital stock, increasing labour productivity 
or decreased inequality of wealth) lead to a perverse relationship between development 
and democratic attitudes. His explanation is that those development paths which decrease 
the costs associated with political uncertainty are the ones likely to foster democracy. 
Path dependence also arises from two other important parameters of the growth process 
viz. unemployment and inequality.  The chronically unemployed (in the working group 
age) with typically low self-respect, have little likelihood of  exercising their civil rights 
in a responsible manner. If growth aggravates chronic unemployment, then,  even if it 
makes a strong dent on poverty, the overall impact on social welfare is questionable. 
Similarly if growth is accompanied by greater inequality, this may lead to the emergence 
of favoured elite groups, which often try to perpetuate their stake in the system through 
political lobbying, party donations and other stratagems, which ultimately result in 
emasculating the democratic process.  
 
We have tried to show that the relationship between capitalism and democracy is far 
more nuanced than usually supposed.  Both the direct and the indirect causal chains 
postulated from capitalism to democracy are extremely tenuous and subject to an 
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overwhelming list of qualifications, many of which are extremely unlikely to be fulfilled 
in practice. In particular, it may be precarious to speculate on the relationship on the basis 
of  over-simplified econometric models, based on questionable data, which seem to be 
the flavour of many of the studies undertaken in this area. Country studies paying in-
depth attention to institutional details might be a more promising line of inquiry. It is in 
this spirit that we now turn our attention to the Indian case.  
 
VII. INDIAN DEMOCRACY : SOME GENERAL FEATURES 
 
The Indian democratic experience has been watched the world over with great interest, as 
in several senses it represents a unique constellation of features. The vast literature on the 
subject, however, presents conflicting perspectives on issues such as democracy and 
governance, ethnicity, social violence, federal structure, party politics etc. (e.g. Brass 
(1990), Kohli (1990), Van der Veer (1994), Weiner (1989), Chadda (2000) etc.). While 
admiration has been frequently expressed for the resilience exhibited by Indian 
democracy in confronting various challenges, there is also a concern among several 
analysts that the Indian state partakes of quasi-authoritarianism and Indian democracy, at 
best, may be regarded as a low quality democracy.  
 
Two broad approaches towards understanding the level of political development in a 
country may be distinguished viz. the structuralist  school and the elite bargaining 
school.  
 
The structuralist school ( Gasiorowski (1995), Gunther et al (1995) etc.) regards certain 
structural features  in a society as the key to understanding democratic transformations in 
a society ( the discussion on social prerequisites of democracy in Section II.2 is thus 
squarely located in this tradition). Most structuralists tend to view democracy in South 
Asia (not excluding India) in somewhat negative terms. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri 
Lanka all exhibit various degrees of ethnic, caste, religious and regional unrest, which is 
often curbed by the use of state violence. Both, the manifestations of this kind of unrest 
and the means of resolving it, lower the democratic worth of these countries in the 
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structuralist assessment. However, such a perception may be faulted as resting on a 
narrow view of democracy, limited to the European democratic transformation. It fails to 
take into account the important issue of “timing of development” (Bollen (1983)). In 
Europe the three processes of territorial consolidation, industrialization and 
democratization, were separated by extended periods of time. By contrast, the  South 
Asian countries have had to cope with all three processes concurrently (Chadda (2000)). 
Some of the unrest springs from the tensions of industrialization (with hitherto 
economically and socially disadvantaged groups becoming progressively more assertive 
about their rights), and a large part of the state violence arises owing to the anxiety of 
governments operating in a context of incomplete territorial consolidation. Thus the 
application of strictly European standards to adjudge South Asian democracy is 
inappropriate and could miss the democratic potential in several of these countries.  
 
Dissatisfaction with the structuralist school has made several scholars turn to the second 
group of political theories viz. those based on strategic choice or elite bargaining 
(Diamond (1990), Linz & Stepan (1997), Przeworski (1992) etc.). These theories focus 
on fulfilment of certain procedural conditions for democracy, arising out of a process of 
bargaining among different elite constituents of a society, about power-sharing norms.13 
Among the major procedures emphasized are : 
 
 
(i) rule of law 
(ii) regular and fair elections 
(iii) stability and governance 
(iv) a free press and 
(v) democratic participation.  
These procedures are in a state of continuous evolution and the process of marketization,  
by shifting the balance of countervailing power between the elite constituents, is likely to 
affect   these conditions in important ways. Apart however from these procedures, one 
should also focus on the socio-economic outcomes of democracy of which the three most 
important are : 
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(i) growth, poverty and inequality 
(ii) environment and natural resources 
(iii) corruption (both by state officials and private agents).  
 
We  begin by reviewing how a shift to markets has affected the above three outcomes and 
then turn to the more general issue of how well India measures up to some of the 
procedural criteria set up by the elite bargaining school as hallmarks of a democracy. 
 
VIII. OUTCOMES OF DEMOCRACY IN INDIA 
 
VIII.1 : GROWTH, POVERTY & INEQUALITY :  
 
Poverty reduction is now enshrined as a prime  goal of development policy worldwide, 
and the welfare enhancing effects of economic growth are seen as directly commensurate 
with the associated reduction in poverty levels. There is by now, a fair degree of 
unanimity among economists that growth is essential for poverty reduction14, under the 
assumption that the distribution of income remains constant (Deininger & Squire (1996), 
Dollar & Kraay (2002) etc.). However, as shown by Ravallion (2004) (also Bourguinon 
(2003)) rapid poverty reduction will be hard to achieve, even in the face of high growth 
rates, if initial income inequality is substantial, or if the growth process itself aggravates 
inequality. Thus the main leg in the “poverty-growth-inequality triangle” (a concept due 
to Bourguinon (2004)) is that connecting growth and inequality. Thus the much touted 
“trickle down” effect of growth policies cannot really be operative unless the inequality 
dimension is attended to.15  
 
We now turn to the Indian situation and examine whether the post-reforms high growth 
phase has been accompanied by impressive poverty alleviation. The first issue that we 
need to confront here is that related to poverty measurement. This is a complex issue, and 
up-to-date estimates on reliable poverty measures are rarely available. International 
comparisons of poverty levels are fraught with even more serious problems. The standard 
concept of poverty is the percent of population below a threshold (poverty line), usually 
based on a minimum level of nutrition in a benchmark year with allowance for some non-
food expenditure and deflated by an appropriate cost of living index. Poverty estimates in 
India are based on the consumer expenditure surveys carried out by the NSSO (National 
Sample Survey Organization)16. After the reforms three quinquennial surveys have been 
carried out viz. the 50th NSS Round (1993-1994), 55th NSS round (1999-2000) and 61st 
NSS Round (2004-2005). As  a benchmark pre-reform comparison point, we use the 
results from the 43rd NSS Round (1987-1988). Results are presented in Table 117.  
 
The table brings out starkly the fact that the dent on poverty is nowhere comparable in the 
post-reforms period to what reforms enthusiasts were prone to claim earlier. Instead of 
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declining by nearly 10% over a 6 year span, it has actually declined only by 8% over an 
11 year span. Thus the average annual decline in the poverty ratio is a meager 0.7%, and 
not 1.6% as thought before.18 Considering that the rate of population growth in the  last 
decade has been around 1.8%, the decline in the poverty ratio translates into an annual 
addition to the absolute number of the chronically poor by about 0.2% (roughly 2 million 
people over the post-reforms period). The situation appears even more gloomy if one 
goes by the latest estimates of poverty compiled afresh by the Tendulkar Committee 
(2009), based on a long-overdue rationalization of the consumption basket of households 
and a focus on the expenditures relating to capabilities of individuals. The new estimates 
of poverty are 37.2% for all of India (with 41.8% for rural areas and 25.7% for urban 
areas).19 Chen & Ravallion(2004) in their well-known comparative study on world 
poverty, using the international poverty line definition ( $1.08 a day per person at 1993 
PPP), obtain significantly higher estimates for the HCR (head count ratio) for India  than 
shown in  Table 1(for the year 2001 for example their HCR is 34.7%). Poverty in India 
has been consistently higher than that in South Asia generally, whether measured by the 
HCR or by Poverty Gap Indices20. 
                 
Juxtaposed with the issue of poverty is that of unemployment. Possibly, unemployment is 
ultimately likely to prove the Achilles' heel of the Indian reforms process. It is now 
unequivocally accepted that the move to market friendly policies globally, has reduced 
the employment elasticity of growth (% increase in employment for a 1% increase in 
growth rate), in LDCs, in ex-socialist countries as well as the OECD group of countries. 
Even in China spectacular growth has co-existed with an urban unemployment problem. 
The aggravation of  the unemployment problem occurs through several channels, the 
main ones for the LDCs being the following: 
 
1) A decline in the terms of trade (ratio of export prices to import prices) owing to the 
low level of demand for LDC exports in the advanced countries. 
2) Corporate restructuring and mergers & acquisitions. 
3) Rapid growth of labour-saving technologies, mainly introduced into LDCs by 
multinationals. 
4) The global spread of new technologies has brought in its wake a new underclass of 
"the learning-disabled" consisting of the least educated older workers.  
 
Empirical analysis of unemployment in India is beset both by data problems as well as a 
multiplicity of measurement concepts. At least four concepts are currently in use viz. 
UPS (usual principal status), UPSS (usual principal and subsidiary status), CWS (current 
weekly status) and CDS (current daily status)21. The unemployment rates (unemployed as 
a fraction of the workforce) are presented in Table 2 below, whereas employment growth 
rates of select sectors is presented in Table 3 (with a breakdown between the organized 
and unorganized sectors).  
 
Both tables underscore the failure of the Indian reforms process to tackle the 
unemployment issue with any success. The unemployment rate (all-India) shows an 
appreciable decline over the pre-reform period (1983 to 1993-1994), but then rises again 
very sharply over the post-reforms period (1993-1994 to 1999-2000 ). The conclusion 
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applies with similar force to the rural unemployment rates, and also (but with 
considerably less force) in the urban case. The sectoral story mirrors the broad pattern 
exhibited by the aggregate unemployment rates. Employment growth ( in both the 
organized and unorganized sectors) has decelerated sharply  in the aftermath of reforms. 
As in the decade prior to reforms, the unorganized sector continues to grow faster than 
the organized sector in the post-reforms period22. This growth has been  accompanied by 
an increasing casualization  of labour (see Deshpande & Deshpande (2001)). 
 
From a futuristic perspective what is a dangerous portent is the declining employment 
elasticity of growth across sectors. This is evident from Table 4 , which shows a steep fall 
in the employment elasticity in the post-reforms  period in all sectors except transport, 
storage & communications, and finance, insurance, real estate  & business services. In the 
remaining sectors (accounting for nearly 94% of the total employment ) employment 
elasticities have registered moderate to steep declines. If the overall employment 
elasticity of 0.13 (obtained over the period 1993-1994 to 1999-2000) is taken as obtaining 
in the near future then even an 8% rate of growth will increase employment by a mere 
1%23. 
               
 Inequality is possibly one of the most neglected and least emphasized dimensions of the 
liberalization programme in LDCs. It becomes a crucial factor determining long-term 
sustainability of the  reforms programme, because of at least two major reasons :  
 
(i) Firstly,  the impact of growth on poverty alleviation is critically dependent on 
the level of initial inequality in a society.  
(ii) Secondly, high levels of inequality are inhibitive of the development and 
survival of  democratic norms in a society.  Inequality undermines good 
public policy, by eroding  collective decision making processes and social 
institutions critical to a healthy functioning of democracy (the so-called 
“vanishing middle class” syndrome as discussed in Nancy Birdsall (2005)). 
 
In a large federal set-up such as India’s, inequality has really two major dimensions viz. 
regional inequality between states and interpersonal inequality. The study by Ahluwalia 
(2002) (covering 14 major states) showed a sharp increase in the Gini coefficient from 
0.175 (1991-92) to 0.233 (1998-99), based on the SDP (state domestic product) per 
capita24. Deaton & Dreze (2002) reiterate similar conclusions but based on per capita 
consumption across states. Thus the process of economic reforms in India does seem to 
have had a noticeably adverse impact on regional inequality. This has the potential to 
create political tensions in a society where regional loyalties have traditionally been 
powerful.  
 
Emerging interpersonal inequality in the wake of reforms in the Third world has attracted 
a great deal of attention from policymakers and academics alike. Several explanations 
have been advanced for the disequalizing impact of liberalization and globalization : 
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(i) So far as trade liberalization is concerned, the so-called Wood thesis (based on 
standard factor price equalization assumptions) leads us to expect a narrowing 
of wage differentials in LDCs (see Wood, 1994), a conclusion hardly borne 
out by the empirical data available. One plausible resolution of this paradox 
revolves around the inappropriate choice of technologies in LDCs. The import 
of First World technologies in LDCs often leads to a scarcity rent for skilled 
labour, aggravating wage inequality (see Lindert and Williamson (2001)). 
Rodrik (1997) stresses an alternative line of explanation in terms of the 
political economy of distribution, in a world of mobile capital and 
immigration inflexibilities. 
(ii) In assessing the distributive impact of globalization on LDCs, a key factor is 
not usually accounted for. This refers to the domestic policy changes 
(including labour market reforms, tax reforms and privatization) which have 
to be initiated to render the country an appealing destination for foreign 
investors. Labour market reforms typically involve relaxation of safety norms, 
reducing job security, and weakening of collective bargaining mechanisms. 
These have obvious impacts on wage dispersion. Tax reforms have been 
characterized by a rolling down of corporation taxes and taxes on trade, with a 
corresponding rise in indirect taxes. This has been accompanied by a 
reduction in the progressivity of direct taxes, especially at the top end. This 
has had some adverse impact on inequality. Privatization and disinvestment, 
wherever it has occurred on a significant scale, has often led to rapid 
concentration of national assets in the hands of a small elite, high service 
charges by the privatized utilities, employment restructuring and erosion of 
regulatory control. Such a combination of factors has considerable potential 
for an unfavourable distributional impact. 
(iii) Domestic financial sector reform tends to raise the share of financial services 
in the GDP. A particularly puzzling feature, for which there seems to be no 
analytical explanation is the relative rise in financial sector salaries as 
compared to salaries in the manufacturing sector (even after correcting for 
standard conditioning factors such as education levels, hours worked, non-
salary incentives, etc.). Another factor contributing to inequality is the 
redistributive impact of the budget which in a largely deregulated financial 
environment could transfer labour incomes to holders of state bonds. 
(iv) The liberalization of cross-border direct investment flows, as well as bank 
loans and portfolio investments has three potential consequences for 
inequality. Firstly, there is the “disciplining” effect on domestic policy, 
involving tax reforms and restraints on organized labour which have already 
been discussed above. Secondly, capital inflows are likely to lead to real 
exchange rate appreciation, which shifts resources to the non-tradeables sector 
and encourages sub-contracting and wage cuts in the tradeables sector to 
preserve profit margins (see Taylor (2000)). Thirdly, increasing openness of 
the capital account increases the vulnerability of the domestic economy to 
financial crises (Caprio & Klingebiel (1996)). These crises have pronounced 
disequalizing effects, especially in countries with weak institutions and social 
safety mechanisms25.  
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For India, data on interpersonal inequality is extremely scanty. However, in spite of this 
obvious limitation, a few empirical exercises have been attempted. The central features 
from  empirical studies such as Mundle & Tulasidhar (1998), Ravallion and Datt (1999) 
and Jha (2000) are that in the 1990s there has been a moderate rise in both rural and 
urban inequality (in contrast to the two previous decades when inequality remained 
constant), accompanied by a decline in urban poverty, but the widening of the rural-urban 
income gap has implied a significant increase in overall inequality.  
 
 VIII. 2  GROWTH, ENVIRONMENT   & NATURAL RESOURCES   : 
 
Environmental policy is plagued by two interacting market failures, relating to 
environmental depletion and environmental technology (Jaffe et al (2004)). The  invisible 
hand , of itself,  often fails to  fully internalize pollution externalities  and hence, 
pollution levels exceed the social optimum, in the absence of state intervention (either in 
the form of taxes or direct control of emissions via enforcement of environmental 
standards). In a representative democracy, where governments lean heavily on industry 
support, the level of taxation on pollution or enforcement of environmental standards will 
most likely fall short of bridging the wedge between private and social marginal costs.  
Similar problems beset the use of natural resources. Market prices will rarely reflect the 
true (shadow cost ) of natural resources , and governments will be reluctant to enforce 
such prices (and may even subsidize the use of natural resources for populist reasons) so 
that there is likely to be an accelerated rate of resource depletion. 
 
Environmental technology, by altering the trade-off between the marginal social cost of 
pollution control and its marginal social benefit, has the potential to reduce overall 
environmental pollution. However, as is well known, technology partakes of the nature of 
a public good, and is subject to “knowledge” and “adoption” externalities (Mankiw & 
Whinston (1986), Griliches (1992), Goulder & Schneider (1999) etc.).  Additionally 
incomplete information, compounds the problems of market failure. Hence innovation 
and diffusion of ECT (environmentally clean technology) is likely to be very tardy, 
especially in LDCs..  
 
Environment is an issue, which has received relatively little attention in India as yet. 
Most of the environmental issues are carried forward by a few NGOs amidst  general 
apathy and policy indifference. A part of the on-going environmental  degradation may 
perhaps reflect  the so-called environmental Kuznets curve, which postulates an inverted 
U relationship between pollution and economic development.26 The environmental 
Kuznets curve is also helpful in understanding the widespread shifting of pollution 
creating industries from the developed countries (who would be most likely on the 
downward  arc of the inverted U-curve) to LDCs (which usually find themselves on the 
upward arc). India furnishes a typical example. Ray & Chaudhury (2004) have identified 
17 major dirty industries in India27, which between themselves account for about 13% of 
the total industrial units in the country and for about 5.65% of national income. 
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On the natural resources front, the situation is to say the least alarming. We illustrate the 
looming crisis in this vital dimension of long-term social welfare, by a single but vital 
issue viz. water. As per international norms (see Report of National Water Commission 
(2002) ) a country is deemed water-stressed if annual per capita water availability falls 
below 1700m3 and water-scarce if this availability goes below 1000m3. In India, the 
latter  threshold was breached in 1991, when annual per capita availability fell to 816m3. 
Since then the availability has been declining precipitously, falling to 672m3  in 2001, 
and projected to fall to 495m3  by 2025. What makes the situation a frightening one to 
contemplate is that access to water is extremely unequal, so that the per capita figure is 
hardly reflective of the privations experienced by  innumerable underprivileged 
households across vast tracts of the country. Urgent measures to overcome this situation 
are needed (see Kumar et al (2005)), but would need a sharp reorientation in the priorities 
of  the present government. Similar comments apply to several other non-renewable 
natural resources such as forests, fossil fuels, bio-diversity etc.  
 
VIII.3 CORRUPTION :   
 
The issue of corruption, though a key constituent of discussions on development, has 
suffered  from a dearth of systematic analysis based on reliable data. Policy initiatives to 
tackle the issue have also correspondingly been slow and ad hoc. Globalization has meant 
that the issue of corruption can only be resolved through sustained international 
cooperation, and here, once again, the very nature of the enterprise has impeded 
progress.28  
 
Strong institutions (judiciary, bureaucracy, police, market regulators, education, public 
opinion  etc) are generally regarded as the  most important factor in keeping corruption in 
check. It is interesting that one of the major planks used by the advocates of reforms to 
support  their case, was that free markets would alleviate corruption in the Third World. 
This thesis was based on the so-called rent-seeking hypothesis of Tullock (1967), 
Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975), which proceeds within a strictly neo-classical 
framework. But as has been extensively noted by later researchers, such a view is unduly 
restricted, and as a matter of fact, free markets in the absence of strong institutions could 
aggravate rather than mitigate corruption (Glynn et al (1997), Williams and Beare 
(1999), Sindzingre (2005) etc.) . In an important recent book, Johnston (2005) presents a 
much more comprehensive analysis of corruption in LDCs, in which the following 
taxonomy of Third World corruption is presented : 
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1. Influence Market Corruption , which involves efforts on the part  of private 
interests to gain control of policy processes, using the politicians and bureaucrats 
as middle-men.  
2. Elite Cartel Corruption, encompasses a network of political, business, military 
and ethnic elites, aimed at preserving their hegemony in a largely poor and 
illiterate society.  
3. Oligarch and Clan Corruption, corresponds to a corruption nexus revolving 
around a handful of government or military officials and entrepreneurs, whose 
power derives from personal resources. 
4. Official Moghuls typically characterize several African or Latin American 
dictatorships, wherein officials brazenly plunder society for personal gain.  
 
Of course, nobody is denying that that the origins of corruption in India are historical, 
dating well back to pre-British times. But confining ourselves to the modern period, 
corruption issues first started coming to wide public attention in the 1970s. This was 
attributed by a wide section of  contemporary commentators to the license-permit Raj 
then prevailing.  As a matter of fact, the rent-seeking hypothesis seemed to serve as a 
convincing explanation of this type of corruption. One of the major arguments in favour 
of reforms, espoused by early proponents  was that reforms would make a serious dent 
into corruption, if not eliminate it altogether. In retrospect, however, this claim turned out 
to be remarkably naïve. Corruption did not recede with the scaling down of controls, but 
resurged with redoubled vigour. The primary reason for this seems to have been 
overlooked in the literature viz. that the character of corruption was metamorphosed in 
the transition to a liberalized economy.  The older rent seeking type of corruption has 
given way to newer forms. Johnston’s (2005) analysis above, seems much more germane 
to the current situation in India. In particular, the first two types of corruption (viz. 
influence market and elite cartel) that he mentions seem to be the dominant modes in 
India, though the other two types could perhaps prevail in remote parts of the country, in 
a strictly localized fashion. The emergence of the newer types of corruption in a 
liberalized - globalized environment can be explained by the emergence  of  several  
mutually reinforcing tendencies, chief among which seem to be the following  
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(i) a pronounced rise in the affluence of sections of the population,  
(ii) a rise in the wealth aspirations of the general populace 
(iii)  a comparative retreat of the State from public  life, with a 
corresponding erosion of the social respect and awe with which State 
power is usually regarded in traditional societies,  
(iv) a serious imbalance between official and private sector salaries, 
resulting in the former facing a steep decline in their relative living 
standards, in spite of their educational attainments and social status 
being comparable with their counterparts in the private sector, 
(v)  the proliferation of newer financial institutions and instruments whose 
convoluted operations are known only to select market players, and 
which are often not understood by either public officials or the press, 
leave alone the ordinary citizen, 
(vi) increased financial returns to corrupt activities, with judicial 
punishments not increasing commensurately with the scale of the 
corrupt transactions29, 
(vii) enlargement of escape avenues for large-scale corrupt activities 
(through party donations, tampering of evidence, influencing 
investigating authorities, and even bribing sections of  the judiciary) 
and  
(viii) above all, increased social tolerance of corruption as an inevitable 
component of modern life , with some people even claiming that 
corruption is a kind of lubricant of economic activity.30  
 
 
While the above discussion may not furnish a complete theory of corruption in a 
liberalized economy, I believe it captures some of the key ingredients that make 
corruption even more extensive and deep rooted in a market oriented economy than in a 
public sector dominated mixed economy.  
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IX. PROCEDURAL  CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRACY : THE INDIAN CASE  
 
IX.1 RULE OF LAW : 
 
Beginning in the 1970s,  there is in evidence in India, a progressive deterioration in the 
rule of law, with political protection and patronage seeping into vital arms of the state 
machinery including civil services, police and even the judiciary. There is no escaping 
the fact that tardy judicial reforms, huge backlogs of civil and criminal cases, and the 
criminal-politician nexus, have seriously eroded public confidence in the rule of law. As 
discussed above in the context of corruption (Section VIII.3), marketization was widely 
anticipated  to act as a check on these tendencies. However, while marketization has to 
some extent emasculated the enormous power wielded by the bureaucracy in the pre-
reforms era, it has given rise to vested corporate interests, which have built up their own 
extensive networks within various arms of the government, and are often successful in 
influencing  legislation to their advantage in matters bearing on their interests (e.g. FDI in 
retail and SEZs being two famous recent  illustrations ).  This lobbying power can often 
become substantial at the state levels, though by the very nature of the subject, concrete 
evidence is hard to come by.  
 
IX.2 REGULAR AND FAIR ELECTIONS:  
On the criterion of regular and fair elections, India’s record may be regarded as 
reasonable, though far from perfect, given factors such as the criminal background of 
several electoral contestants, role of black money in funding elections, and the nexus 
between industry groups and politicians. There are three factors, however, which seem to  
offer some room for future optimism. Firstly, there is a greater awareness of civil and 
political rights among all sections of society (on account of  literacy, telecommunications, 
improved labour mobility etc.). This is reflected in increasing resort to PIL 
 ( public interest litigation) and the RTI (Right to Information Act) in recent years. 
Secondly, there has been a welcome increase in the vigilance of all sections of the media, 
the several    sting operations  and exposes having had the effect of putting the actions of 
 28 
politicians, bureaucrats and the police under a public scanner. Thirdly, the Election 
Commission (EC) in recent years has taken on an increasingly pro-active role, often 
countermanding elections, whenever sharp practices are detected (see Gill (1998)).  
 
IX.3   STABILITY & GOVERNANCE : 
 
One of the reasons cited by political theorists such as Diamond (1990), for regarding 
Indian democracy with a degree of skepticism, is an unstable state, the instability  
manifesting itself in frequent change of governments  and prevalence of  coalitions. 
However, a distinction needs to be made between instability of governments and the 
instability of the political system. Chadda’s (2000) parallel to the Third and Fourth 
French Republics (1870-1940 and 1946-1958 respectively) is particularly germane in this 
context. The frequent collapse of the governments in France during this era has not been 
viewed by historians as signaling a retreat of  French democracy. However, frequent 
government instability could pave the ground for public demand for  stronger and more 
centralized governments, as happened in France when General de Gaulle was voted in as 
President in 1959 with vastly enhanced powers and a long tenure of seven years.  
 
Governance problems are more serious and in several parts of the country credibility of 
government is all but non-existent. This lack of credibility either manifests itself in 
general lawlessness or occasionally in  separatist movements or civil war type of 
conditions.  Insurgency movements (such as those in the Punjab in the 1980s, in the 
North-East since 1970s and Naxalism in the past few years) coupled with organized 
crime have rendered vast tracts of land ungovernable (see Ketkar (2003)). Marketization, 
while hardly the sole causal factor,  may be viewed as a secondary aggravating factor 
behind some of the social unrest such as Naxalism and communal riots, whose origins 
can be partly traced to the inequality and marginalization associated with the 
implementation of market reforms in India.31  
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IX.4 FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA: 
  
The Indian press  has had a long and respected tradition of integrity, social accountability 
and pluralism. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Press served  as a forum for several 
intellectual and ideological debates of an exceptionally high order. The leading role of the 
Press in curbing the excesses of the Emergency and in ultimately bringing about its 
termination, is now a historically accepted fact. Similarly the IMF loan and the Uruguay 
Round negotiations of the 1980s, generated rich debates in the Press in which 
intellectuals participated heartily, irrespective of their ideological colour. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the main danger to the freedom of the Press came from an aggressive State—a 
danger that the Press was largely successful in warding off. But a new and much more 
subtle threat to Press freedom has emerged in the liberalized regime viz. corporate 
interests backed by money power, often acting in conjunction with the government. 
Corporate financial control  has long been the dominant mode of Press ownership in 
India, but this model worked well as long as editorial independence was sanctified. In the 
wake  of liberalization, this healthy “arms’ length” relationship between the editorial 
office and the management was dissipated, and editorial freedom was made subservient 
to management interests. This has implied a complete overhaul in the style of newspaper 
functioning in India. News coverage and news analysis has undergone a metamorphosis. 
The base of the readership has been sought to be widened by sacrificing serious content, 
in favour of entertainment oriented reportage. Few dailies have been able to withstand the 
allurements of huge assured advertisement revenues. Simultaneously, there is in evidence 
a concerted attempt to influence readers in the direction of the new market philosophy. 
The broad plurality of views and the lively debates, so much a hallmark of the earlier 
years, seems to have given place to a certain standardisation of expression, and an 
impression sought to be deliberately created about a societal consensus on liberalization 
and globalization. 
 
A key role in fostering this “orchestrated consensus”, has been assigned to a new breed 
of editorial collaborators, comprising primarily corporate economists, management 
gurus, and financial  executives who share a common and somewhat naïve optimism 
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about the marketization philosophy, regarding every move in the direction of markets 
and globalization as welfare enhancing, blissfully unaware of the necessary caveats that 
more careful analysts would enter. It is thus extremely unfortunate that courtesy the 
media, the terms of economic discourse in India have become the virtual monopoly of 
this group of contributors, who with their casual empiricism and short-term sectional 
perspectives often act as a strong pressure group and even as a feedback and grading 
mechanism for regulators and policymakers, who often are lured into the trap of 
following the markets by following the market analysts. 32Thus policymakers often end 
up adopting the markets’ short-term horizon as their own which lends an unwarranted 
and  dangerous “short-termism” to official policy. In turn, long-term issues like 
unemployment, regional imbalances, energy, environment, natural resources  and 
demographic change get relegated to the background of national consciousness. 
 
IX.5 DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: 
 
 Public opinion has always been regarded as an essential pillar of a vibrant 
democracy. Its quality is governed by a host of factors, some historical and others 
societal, whereas its effectiveness depends directly on the influence that intellectuals are 
allowed to exert on the decision-making processes of that society. Formal theories of how 
public opinion shapes the course of democracies may be found in Easterlin (1998), 
Putnam et al (1993), Avner & Putterman (1998) etc. but we adopt a more informal mode 
of analysis here. 
 
 One can distinguish at least four major avenues through which intellectual 
opinion can contribute to national policy in a modern democracy. 
 
(i) Direct participation in the political process 
(ii) Serving as advisors and consultants on official and semi-official bodies 
concerned with policy formulation. 
(iii) Serving as public representatives on boards of banks, institutes, companies 
etc. and 
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(iv) Influencing public opinion and acting as its watchdog through books and 
popular media vehicles, especially newspapers and T.V. 
 
All of these four possible roles have been steadily eroded in India, over the past thirty 
years or so, till we find today, that the intellectual has been virtually expelled from the 
national consciousness. 
Direct participation of intellectuals in the political process, while a common feature of the 
Independence struggle, seems to have steadily declined over the years in direct 
proportion to the increasing role played by money power in the electoral process and the 
growing nexus between crime and politics. But while the  withdrawal of the intellectual 
from the political arena is possibly in line with trends elsewhere, the gradual eclipse of 
the advisory role of the intellectuals in policy-making bodies seems to be a specifically 
South Asian feature.  This has not been without an impact on the general quality of these 
organisations, which have become pale shadows of their former selves. Their autonomy 
has been seriously eroded. Several of them are today dominated by social scientists (often 
appointed either at the behest of international multilateral bodies or to appease sectional 
domestic interests), who predictably end up acting as apologists for policies determined 
by the political leadership, instead of functioning as independent and disinterested 
advisers33.   
The politicization of the top policy-making bodies has in due course filtered downwards.  
The role of public representatives on boards of banks, companies etc. had traditionally 
been allotted to distinguished senior professionals, experts or academics.  However, over 
time, political appointees on boards have become a well-established norm.  
Liberalisation and the growing importance of the corporate sector has in turn, implied a 
desire by big businesses to exercise control on banks and other financial institutions.  
The list of board members of several financial institutions (including nationalized banks) 
appears today like the Who's Who of corporate India34.  
 
  The above noted features have left intellectuals only one avenue for expressing 
their involvement with social concerns viz. the popular media comprising primarily 
newspapers. But as discussed above, the Indian media today is largely dominated by the 
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interests of large business, and fully preoccupied in its role as  an endorsement of 
official policy (to the extent that  such policy is in consonance with corporate interests).  
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Beginning the middle of the nineteenth century right up to the Second World War, there 
were two diametrically opposed utopian visions – the capitalist vision in which 
democracy and capitalism were seen as mutually reinforcing35, and its Marxian anti-
thesis that only the elimination of markets and private property could result in the 
emancipation of the working classes and the establishment of a genuine democracy 
(Hirschman 1986, Flora & Heidenheimer 1981, Olson 1982 etc). It is interesting to note 
that whereas Marxist intellectuals have long abandoned this orthodox Marxist position 
(Poulantzas 1985, Offe 1984, Gramsci 1971 etc), the laissez faire proponents have, if 
anything, become even more orthodox in their emphasis on market forces36  
 
Apart from the economic efficiency arguments put forth in favour of the laissez faire 
economy, several prominent thinkers have seen markets as reinforcing the democratic 
forces in a society. This was viewed as operating through two channels – via a common 
set of values and attitudes shared by the two systems and an indirect linkage of 
marketization and democracy via growth, material prosperity and welfare. However we 
have tried to show that in general, societies may exhibit distinct preferences towards 
increased material prosperity and democratic institutions, depending on the stage of their 
development. In particular, material welfare need not always be followed by greater 
democratic aspirations.  Thus the proposition that marketization enhances democracy via 
a benevolent chain based on growth, social welfare and a shared value system, is fraught 
with far too many qualifications, to claim general validity.  
 
The second half of our paper is a brief foray into the factors conditioning Indian 
democracy and how the liberalization process under way since 1990, has impinged these 
factors.  While generalizations are hazardous, they are hard to resist, and possibly the 
only assessments possible in the absence of detailed empirical data. Bearing these 
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qualifications fully in mind, we venture to assert that the process of marketization and 
globalization in India, as it has proceeded since 1997, may be viewed as guided by a 
naïve belief in the magic of markets, instead of a strategic move towards reforms (as was 
largely the case from 1992 to 1997). The pacing and sequencing aspects of liberalization 
have been virtually ignored, the reforms process being buffeted around by corporate 
lobbying on the one hand and the aspirations of a growing elite consumerist class on the 
other. This kind of haphazard marketization is liable to accentuate several of the inherent 
tensions between marketization and democracy, and in the long run pose threats both to 
the economy as well as to civil society. Among the potential sources of social malaise, 
the following seem to be the most important: 
 
(i) the long-term sustainability of a “service-led” growth 
(ii) the implications for poverty and unemployment of  high growth concentrated 
in a few leading service sectors, with relative stagnation in traditional 
manufacturing sectors 
(iii) the limits to natural resources such as water and minerals, owing to the 
absence of any long-term strategies 
(iv) the widening gap between advanced and backward states in India 
(v) the aggravation of corruption that has resulted from the strongly “pro-
business” type of  liberalization followed in India  
(vi) the increased vulnerability of the economy to financial crises, and the 
regressive burden imposed by such crises on the poor 
(vii)  the social and political problems associated with increasing inequality of 
incomes and growing wage differentials between the skilled and unskilled 
labour force (both of which are enhanced under market oriented reforms) 
(viii) the process of marketization also poses several threats to press freedom, and 
the expression (and quality) of public opinion.  
 
In his Introduction to the IEA Conference volume on Democracy and 
Development, Bagchi (1995) has succinctly summed up  the complex interactions 
between democracy and capitalism in the Third World as follows 
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“A more principled distinction between the development of individual capabilities 
….and the development of the economy may be helpful for clarity. The relevance of texts 
in discussion of the traditions of democratic and authoritarian strands of political 
thought must be assessed in the context of whether decent human existence is permitted 
under the regime being advocated, given the geopolitical setting of particular countries. 
At the same time social scientists should be aware of selective amnesia in judging the 
relevance of particular discourses…..the local setting of political discourse and the 
social relations giving shape to particular economic regimes can be ignored only at the 
risk of rendering the academic analysis of the linkages between democracy and 
development irrelevant for most participants in the economic and political process.” 
 
In the light of Bagchi’s quotation, one can only express the pious hope that Indian 
policymakers make a sincere effort to understand Indian reality better, before attempting 
to change it further. 
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TABLE 1 
 
POVERTY MEASUREMENT -HCR (HEAD COUNT RATIO) 
 
 1987-1988 1993-1994 1999-2000 2004-2005 
Rural 
 
39.1% 37.3% 27.1% 22% 
Urban 
 
38.2% 32.4% 23.6% 21.6% 
All-India 
 
38.9% 36% 26.1% 28% 
        
Source: Sen & Himanshu (2004) and  Radhakrishnan & Panda (2006)                        
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  
 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES % (CDS BASIS) 
 
 1983 1993-1994 1999-2000 
ALL-INDIA 8.30 5.99 7.32 
RURAL  7.96 5.61 7.21 
URBAN 9.64 7.19 7.65 
 
Source:  NSSO Various Rounds 
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TABLE 3 
 
SECTOR-WISE EMPLOYMENT GROWTH  RATES 
(CDS BASIS) 
 
 ORGANIZED UNORGANIZED 
SECTOR 1983-1994 1994-2000 1983-1994 1994-2000 
1.Agriculture 0.02 -1.00 2.23 0.03 
2. Mining & 
Quarrying 
-1.91 -1.30 3.68 -2.40 
3.Manufacturing 2.58 0.87 2.26 2.95 
4. Electricity, 
Gas & Water 
Supply 
-3.55 0.51 5.31 -17.00 
5. Construction 5.21 -0.69 4.18 5.85 
6. Trade, Hotels 
& Restaurants 
5.72 1.43 3.80 5.79 
7. Transport, 
Storage & 
Communications 
5.53 0.21 3.35 7.59 
8. Finance, 
Insurance, Real 
Estate & 
Business 
Services 
5.40 1.27 4.60 8.30 
9. Community, 
Social & 
Personal 
Services 
-2.08 0.8 3.85 -3.56 
All Sectors 1.07 0.56 2.67 1.12 
 
Source:    Planning Commission (2002), Hansda & Ray (2006).  
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TABLE 4 
 
SECTOR-WISE EMPLOYMENT ELASTICITIES (CDS) 
 
 
SECTOR SHARE OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
(1999-2000) 
(%) 
PRE-REFOPRM 
PERIOD 
1983-1984 TO 
1993-1994 
POST-REFORM 
PERIOD 
1993-1994 TO 
1999-2000 
1.Agriculture 
 
56.7 0.48 0.01 
2. Mining & 
Quarrying 
0.67 0.61 -0.49 
3. Manufacturing 12.11 0.32 0.20 
4. Electricity, Gas & 
Water Supply 
0.34 0.48 -0.52 
5. Construction 4.44 1.27 1.00 
6. Trade, Hotels & 
Restaurants 
11.15 0.67 0.38 
7. Transport, 
Storage & 
Communications 
4.05 0.55 0.56 
8. Finance, 
Insurance, Real 
Estate & Business 
Services 
1.38 0.49 0.68 
9. 
Community,Social 
& Personal Services 
9.16 0.63 0.02 
All Sectors 100 0.36 0.13 
 
Source:  Planning Commission (2002) 
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 Of course,  the above consensus is not universal, and  large sections of populations (as well as 
the intelligentsia) in mainly the underdeveloped countries remain unconvinced by the  elegantly 
argued out logic of its proponents. Not surprisingly therefore, market based policies have often 
met with substantial popular resistance.  The process by which Third World governments have 
been able to overcome opposition to such policies and whether in the process, certain democratic 
principles have been compromised, is an issue to which insufficient attention seems to have been 
devoted. We propose therefore in our paper to devote some attention to this issue too.    
 
2
 This is of course, not to deny the existence of substantial and influential sections of opinion, 
which have episodically dominated world politics, and which are in  outright opposition to 
democratic ideals.  Fascism (as expounded by philosophers such as Fichte and Gentile ) on the 
one hand,  and  communism  drawing inspiration from   thinkers such as Marx (2001, originally 
published 1875) and Plekhanov (1974, originally published 1883), on the other.  
 
3
 Needless to say, the various  issues listed, are so strongly inter-connected, that  presenting them 
in a compartmentalized fashion would not only be highly artificial, but might also conceal 
important synergic and feedback effects. There are, therefore, the inevitable (though occasional) 
 “ back and forth” movements in our argumentation. It is only to be hoped that in spite of such 
switches, we have managed to retain  a degree of  coherence in the chain of reasoning.  
 
4
 We do not go into a discussion of the issue of whether and under what circumstances growth 
leads to overall material development as  this has been extensively discussed in the literature (see  
Peter Bartelmus (2008)  for a recent update ). Broadly speaking growth may be described as 
necessary but not sufficient for development.  
5
 . As Rostow (1971), p.268 puts it “ governments take their shape legitimately only from some 
effective expression of the combined will and judgements of individuals”. Of course, this does not 
imply that every individual is continuously involved with each aspect of government. Rather, 
individual preferences are sought to be articulated through a system of majority-elected 
representatives, based on political groups or parties (Cohen (1971), Ravich (2000) etc.). 
 
6
  It is interesting to note that an essential ingredient in the perceived benevolent link between free 
markets and democracy  is a strongly-held belief in the virtues of competition in both economic 
and political markets (e.g. Hayek (1960), Friedman (1963) etc.) 
7
 None of the writers staking this claim have clarified the version of capitalism that they are 
talking about. But implicitly they seem to have the ideal version at the back of their minds.  
8
 Schumpeter, however, also recognized certain important inconsistencies and contrary impulses 
within the two systems.  
9
 To quote Weitzman (op. cit.) again “ Capitalism is a market place of goods and democracy is a 
market place of ideas”. 
10
 The following quotation from Friedman (1963) is the most explicit statement of this viewpoint.  
‘History suggests only that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is 
not a sufficient condition. Fascist Italy and Fascist Spain, Germany at various times in the last 
seventy years, Japan before World Wars I and II, tzarist Russia in the decades before World War 
I -- are all societies that cannot conceivably be described as politically free. Yet, in each, private 
enterprise was the dominant form of economic organization. It is therefore clearly possible to 
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have economic arrangements that are fundamentally capitalist and political arrangements that 
are not free’ (Friedamn (1963), Chapter 1). I am grateful to Pranab Bardhan for bringing this 
point to my notice.  
 
11
 The DSM theorem has been refined and formalized through the successive writings of Debreu 
(1974), Sonnenschein (1974) and Mantel (1974). A brief explanation may run as follows. The 
foundations of  neoclassical economics rest on the assumption that if individual demand functions 
satisfy Wald’s (1936) WARP (weak axiom of revealed preference) (implying individual demand 
curves are downward sloping) then a unique stable market equilibrium exists. The DSM theorem 
asserts that whereas the WARP is sufficient to ensure the existence and local   uniqueness (of a 
market equilibrium), global uniqueness and stability are not ensured by WARP (or by even 
stronger restrictions on individual demand functions) (see  Kemp & Shimomura (2002) for 
example). In spite of Hahn’s (1975) admission that the DSM results are “most damaging to 
neoclassical theory”, the mainstream economics profession has largely ignored these 
implications, (plausible reasons for this neglect are discussed in Hodgson (1997) and Rizvi 
(1994)). 
 
12
 Moore (1966) also indicates that where the landed aristocracy was able to resist modernization 
by containing and dominating the rising commercial classes as in Germany and Japan,  industrial 
capitalism gave rise to fascism.. 
  
13
 While analysts (e.g. Chadda (1997), Shapiro (1993) etc.) usually tend to favour the elite 
bargaining school as providing a better explanation of South Asian democratic patterns (as 
compared to structuralism) attention has also been drawn to an important common limitation 
shared by the two schools of thought. This derives from the common failing of attempting to 
apply concepts derived from Western democratic traditions to countries with vastly differing 
political and economic histories. Such a view leads them, for example, to view primordial 
identities (such as those based on religion, ethnicity, language, caste etc.) as inimical to 
democratic development (e.g. Kohli (1997)). As Lijphart (1996, 1999) has shown in his important 
work on consociational democracy, such identities have not prevented countries like India from 
evolving a consensual power-sharing arrangement among the various identity groups. 
 
14
 Kraay (2005), for example, has shown that poverty changes in any country can be decomposed 
into three ingredients : (i) growth in per capita income (ii) elasticity of poverty reduction with 
respect to growth and (iii) changes in income distribution. Using a cross-country sample, Kraay 
finds that about 70% of the medium term variation (and 95% of the long-term variation) in 
headcount poverty changes is attributable to the growth factor alone, with the other factors 
playing a marginal role.  
 
15
 Lopez & Serven (2006) have given several illustrations of growth objectives in conflict with 
the poverty reduction and equity objectives. Among the important trade offs that they identify are 
the following : (i) higher spending on poverty related projects (rural infrastructure and housing, 
education, health etc.) versus the dictates of fiscal prudence (ii) capital account liberalization 
versus locking up of funds in forex reserves and (iii) protecting property rights of peasants versus 
the creation of SEZs for foreign investors. 
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16
 There are annual surveys based  on a thin sample of 4 households per village/urban block as 
also the quinquennial surveys based on a thick  sample of 8 to 10 households per village/urban 
block.  
17
 The poverty line used in the Table is as per the recommendations of an Expert Group set up by 
the Planning Commission in 1993. It uses a base poverty line of per capita consumption of  Rs. 49 
per month (rural) and Rs. 57 per month (urban), based on the recommended daily intake of 2400 
calories (rural) and 2100 calories (urban) . Adjustments are made to this base by using  the CPI 
for agricultural workers in case of the rural line and the CPI for industrial workers for the urban 
poverty line.  
18
 The fact that all-India poverty  ratio has increased as between 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 is 
largely a reflection of the fact that the results of the 55th NSS Round are not comparable with the 
results of the 50th round. The methodology of the 61st Round is however comparable to that of the 
50th Round (and hence not with that of the 55th Round). 
19
 Interestingly some tentative calculations extrapolating the Tendulkar methodology to the earlier 
years reported in the press (see Patnaik (13 December 2009))  also posit a decline of 8.1% over 
the comparable 11 year span.  
 
20
 The Poverty Gap Index refers to the proportionate shortfall of income of all the poor from the 
poverty line as expressed in per capita terms (for the entire population). 
21
 For detailed explanations of the various concepts involved,  see Hansda & Ray (2006)) 
22
 According to one  estimate,  the unorganized  sector accounted for  91.66% of the total 
employed labour force in 1999-2000. 
23
 Or putting it more graphically since the work force is growing at about 1.2% annually, a  9.5% 
growth is necessary to keeping the growing workforce employed, without adding to the existing 
unemployment backlog.  
24
 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, with higher values of the coefficient indicating 
greater inequality.  
25
 Galbraith & Lu (1999) for example, document that in Latin America financial crises raised 
inequality by 73% and in the Asian crisis inequality rose by 62%. Diwan (2000) also notes the 
marked permanent decline in labour shares following financial crises. 
 
26
 In the early stages of development, it is reasoned that awareness of environmental concerns is 
typically low, and hence there is little public support for  pollution taxes/standards. The relation is 
reversed after the crossing of a certain threshold level of income, and thenceforth societal demand 
for a cleaner environment rises.  
 
27
 The 17 industries include aluminium, caustic soda, cement, copper, distillery, dyes, fertilizers, 
pesticides,leather, iron & steel, pulp & paper, sugar, zinc, chemicals, plastic, wood & wood 
products, and electricity.  
28
 Transparency International  is barely over a decade old, the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery did not go on line till 1999 (OECD, 2003), and anti-money laundering initiatives are still 
in their infancy (Financial Action Task Force 2004, and Financial Services Authority, 2003) 
29
 Outdated legal systems often mean that the financial component of the punishment is a small 
fraction of the total magnitude of the amount involved in  the corrupt deal. Besides conviction 
itself is rare and in most countries (except China) prison sentences are light.  
30
 Some of the perpetrators of the 1992 stock market scam acquired the status of heroes in the 
public imagination--witness the widespread demonstrations in support of Harshad Mehta in 
Mumbai around that time. 
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31
 In a series of important contributions, Chua (1998) has argued that “ the combined pursuit of 
marketization and democratization in  the developing world is likely to catalyze ethnic tensions..” 
(Chua 1998, p. 6). Her reasons for this thesis is that markets often reinforce the economic 
dominance of certain ethnic minorities, pitting an economically dominant ethnic minority against 
a politically powerful but impoverished majority. While her thesis seems to apply to several 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, its strict validity in the Indian context seems 
doubtful, where the sources of both communal and caste tension centre around historically 
inherited  imbalances, the  call for “affirmative action” from minorities and lower castes to 
redress these, and the strong backlash against the same from the communities left outside the 
scope of such affirmative actions.  
 
32
 As Blinder, a noted American economist and one time U.S Central Banker, has aptly put it  
“ the incessant din of market chatter …(tempts policymakers) to deliver the policy that markets 
expected or demanded” (see Blinder (1997)). 
33
 It is a redeeming feature that the situation is far better with respect to the organizations and 
institutes dealing  with science and technology.  
34
 Given the wide-ranging powers of these boards, they play a very important role in deciding 
loan policies and investments of financial institutions. Since the flow of funds in the economy is 
very largely at the disposition of the banking system, we are rapidly approaching a situation 
where the objectives of monetary policy and other official financial sector measures could be 
frustrated by coordination failures between the central bank and the financial institutions. 
35
 Cf. Schumpeter (1943) “ History clearly confirms …..[that]….modern democracy rose along 
with capitalism, and in causal connection with it…..modern democracy is a product of the 
capitalist process” 
36
 Of course the modern methodology is far more sophisticated and mathematical,  as compared 
to that of the founding fathers of the doctrine,  like Adam Smith, David Ricardo and J.S. Mill. 
 
 
 
 
